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HUB  LAW  OFFICES 
Ford  Greene,  Esquire 
California  State  Bar  No.  107601 
711  Sir  Francis  Drake  Boulevard 
San  Anselmo,  California  94960-1949 
Telephone:  (415)  258-0360 


FILED 

MAR  -  3  1992 


HOWARD  HANSON 

MARIN  COUNTY  CLERK 
By  A.  Cucpwr,  Deputy 


Attorney  for  Defendant 
GERALD  ARMSTRONG 


RECEIVED 

MAR  3  1992 

HUB  LAW  OFFICES 

SUPERIOR  COURT  OF  THE  STATE  OF  CALIFORNIA 
IN  AND  FOR  THE  COUNTY  OF  MARIN 


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CHURCH  OF  SCIENTOLOGY 
INTERNATIONAL,  a  California 
not-for-profit  religious 
corporation ; 


Plaintiffs, 


vs . 


GERALD  ARMSTRONG;  DOES  1 
through  25,  inclusive, 


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Defendants . 


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No.  152  229 


MEMORANDUM  OF  POINTS  AND 
AUTHORITIES  IN  SUPPORT  OF 
MOTION  FOR  CONTINUANCE  OF 
HEARING  DATE  ON  PLAINTIFF'S 
ORDER  TO  SHOW  CAUSE 
RE  PRELIMINARY  INJUNCTION 

Date:  March  6,  1992 

Time:  10:30  a.m. 

Calendar:  L  &  M 
Hearing  Judge:  Dept. .4 
Trial  Judge:  Not  Assigned 
Arbitration:  Not  Assigned 


INTRODUCTION 

On  February  4,  1992,  the  Honorable  Beverly  B.  Savitt  ordered 
Defendant  GERALD  ARMSTRONG  to  show  cause  why  a  certain  settlement 
agreement  should  not  be  enforced  against  him  by  means  of  a 
preliminary  injunction  and  set  a  hearing  on  the  matter  for  10:30 
a.m.  on  March  6,  1992  in  Department  5.  Greene  Declaration,  at 
2  . 

This  ex  parte  application  is  for  one  continuance  for  a  period 
of  thirty  (30)  days,  or  whatever  period  the  Court  determines  to  be 


HUB  1AW  OFFICES 
Ford  Greene,  Esquire 
711  Sir  Francis  Drake  Blvd. 
San  Anselmo,  CA  94960 
(415)  258-0360 


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HEM0RAHDDM  OF  POXHTS  AHD  AUTHORITIES  SUPPORTIBG  COBTIHUAHCE 


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FF1CES 

Esquire 


f  in  order  to  allow  ARMSTRONG  to  meet  plaintiff's 
application  for  a  preliminary  injunction. 

STATEMENT  OF  FACTS 

The  factual  basis  asserted  in  support  of  the  application  for 
a  preliminary  injunction  involves  facts  which  span  an  eight  year 
period  of  time.  The  legal  relief  sought  by  plaintiff,  if  granted, 
at  minimum  would  result  in  a  prior  restraint  of  Defendant 
ARMSTRONG'S  First  Amendment  right  to  freedom  of  speech  as  well  as 
prohibit  him,  in  perpetuity,  from  engaging  in  gainful  employment. 
Additionally,  were  a  preliminary  injunction  to  issue  the  public  s 
right  to  know  —  to  obtain  information  regarding  the  public  issue 
of  the  nature  and  practices  of  Scientology  -  would  be  adversely 
affected,  thus  injuring  the  "marketplace  of  ideas"  protected  by 

the  First  Amendment.  Id.  at  H  3. 

The  agreement  which  plaintiff  seeks  the  assistance  of  this 
Court  to  enforce  against  ARMSTRONG  contains  a  number  of  provisions 
the  net  effect  of  which  violate  public  policy  as 

(1)  an  obstruction  of  justice; 

(2)  a  suppression  of  evidence  of  judicially  tested  facts 
which  discredit  the  Scientology  organization;  and 

(3)  an  offer  to  dissuade  participation  in  judicial 
proceedings  in  violation  of  Penal  Code  section  138.  Id.  at  If  4. 

Plaintiff  has  purchased  the  agreement  and  cooperation  of 
those  who  were  Defendant  ARMSTRONG'S  former  counsel  at  the  time  he 
executed  the  settlement  agreement.  Such  attorneys  are  now 
prevented  from  providing  any  information  to  ARMSTRONG  in  this  case 
regarding  the  circumstances  of  the  execution  of  the  settlement 
agreement,  by  declaration  or  otherwise,  unless  said  attorneys  are 


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HUB  LAW  OFFICES 
Ford  Greene,  Esquire 
71 1  Sir  Francis  Drake  Btvd. 
San  Anselmo,  CA  94960 
(415)  258-0360 


compelled  by  deposition  subpoena  to  do  so.  ARMSTRONG  has 
requested  plaintiff  to  release  said  attorneys  from  the  strictures 
of  said  agreement,  but  has  not  yet  received  any  response  from 
plaintiff  on  this  issue.  Id.  at  6,  7. 

Finally,  ARMSTRONG  was  one  of  a  number  of  individuals 
knowledgeable  of  the  illegal  and  criminal  practices  of  plaintiff. 
All  said  individuals  have  been  silenced  by  a  "global"  or  "block" 
settlement  agreement,  of  which  ARMSTRONG  is  a  single  component.  It 
is  this  agreement  that  plaintiff  seeks  the  Court's  assistance  in 
enforcing  against  ARMSTRONG.  Id.  at  *[  5.  Like  ARMSTRONG'S  former 
attorneys,  such  individuals  have  been  silenced  with  respect  to 
discussing  the  circumstances  wherein  ARMSTRONG  executed  the 
settlement  agreement,  unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  deposition 
subpoena.  Id.  at  U  8. 

Since  plaintiff  relies  on  the  Eleventh  Circuit  decision 
upholding  the  District  Court's  denial  of  the  press'  request  for 
access  to  the  sealed  Wakefield  contempt  proceedings,  in  Wakefield 
v.  Church  of  Scientology  in  the  U.S.  District  Court,  Middle 
District  of  Florida,  Case  No.  82— 1313— CIV— T— 10A,  it  raises  the 
facts  underlying  the  Wakefield  proceedings.  For  a  period  of  time, 
ARMSTRONG'S  counsel  was  counsel  for  Wakefield  and  possesses 
information  material  to  the  manner  in  which  the  Scientology 
Organization  obtain  the  preliminary  injunction  therein.  Since 
those  proceedings  have  been  sealed,  I  ARMSTRONG'S  counsel  is 
constrained  from  discussing  his  knowledge  thereof  without  an  order 
from  Judge  Kovachevich  allowing  him  to  do  so.  Id.  at  1  9. 

Plaintiff  would  not  be  prejudiced  by  any  delay  occasioned  by 
the  grant  of  a  reasonable  continuance.  Plaintiff  complains  that 


MEMORAHDUM  OF  FOISTS  AHD  AUTHORITIES  SUPPORTING  COHTISUAHGE 


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ZA  94960 

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the  conduct  of  ARMSTRONG,  which  it  would  have  this  court  enjoin, 
commenced  in  June  1991.  In  light  of  the  fact  that  plaintiff 
waited  until  February  1992  to  seek  an  injunction  belies  any  claim 
it  may  make  that  the  granting  of  a  continuance  would  prejudice  it. 
Were  ARMSTRONG ' s  conduct  so  prejudicial,  plaintiff  would  not  have 
delayed  eight  (8)  months  in  seeking  injunctive  relief. 

Id.  at  K  11. 

For  the  foregoing  reasons,  as  well  as  for  other  reasons, 
defendant  GERALD  ARMSTRONG  desires  one  reasonable  continuance  to 
enable  him  to  meet  plaintiff's  application  for  a  preliminary 
injunction. 

ARGUMENT 

In  pertinent  part.  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  section  527  (a) 

states  as  follows: 

An  injunction  may  be  granted  at  any  time  before 
judgment  on  a  verified  complaint,  or  upon  affidavits  if 
the  complaint  in  one  case,  or  the  affidavits  in  the 
other,  show  satisfactorily  that  sufficient  grounds  exist 
therefor. 

-k  -k  -k 

The  defendant,  however,  shall  be  entitled,  as  of 
course,  to  one  continuance  for  a  reasonable  period,  it 
he  or  she  desires  it,  to  enable  him  of  her  to  meet  the 
application  for  preliminary  injunction.  .  .  . 

Section  527  has  been  interpreted  not  to  be  as  absolute  as  it 
literally  reads.  In  circumstances,  such  as  that  which  is  before 
the  court  now,  where  a  temporary  restraining  order  has  not  issued, 
whether  to  grant  a  continuance  is  discretionary  with  the  Court. 
Although  in  cases  wherein  a  temporary  restraining  order  has  not 
issued,  the  responding  party  has  no  absolute  right  to  a 
continuance,  Wutchumna  Water  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  (1932)  215  C. 
734,  739,  12  P.2d  1033,  1035,  the  court,  in  an  exercise  of  its 

p^gQ  4  MEMORANDUM  OF  POINTS  AND  AUTHORITIES  SUPPORTING  CONTINUANCE 


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HUB  LAW  OFFICES 
Ford  Greene,  Esquire 
711  Sir  Frauds  Drake  BhtL 
San  Artsehno,  CA  94960 
(415)  258-0360 


discretion  may  grant  one  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time.  Cohen 
v .  Herbert  (1960)  186  Cal.App.2d  488,  493,  8  CR  922;  Accord ,  1 

C.E.B.  Civil  Procedure  Before  Trial,  Injunctions,  §  1557. 

CONCLUSION 

In  light  of  the  facts  in  this  case  pertaining  to  defendant 
ARMSTRONG'S  need  for  a  reasonable  continuance,  and  the  absence  of 
prejudice  to  plaintiff,  as  set  forth  above,  and  in  light  of  the 
fact  that  plaintiff  delayed  one  week  in  filing  its  moving  papers 
after  the  point  at  which  it  obtained  an  Order  to  Show  Cause  issued 
from  Judge  Savitt,  defendant  GERALD  ARMSTRONG  respectfully  submits 
that  his  ex  parte  application  for  a  reasonable  continuance  should 


be  granted. 

DATED:  March  3,  1992 


HUB  LAW  OFFICES 


i'ORD  GREENE) 

Attorney  for  ^Defendant 
GERALD  ARMSTRONG 


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MEMDRAHDUM  OF  POXHTS  AHD  AUTHORITIES  SUP PORT  IBG  COHTIHUAHCE